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Conference Summary
Clinical Issues in
the Prophylaxis,
Diagnosis, and
Treatment
of Anthrax
On November 18, 2001, a meeting
was held at the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC),
Atlanta, Georgia, to discuss the pro-
phylaxis, diagnosis, and treatment of
anthrax. Participants included clini-
cians and health department person-
nel from areas where anthrax cases
were identified, infectious disease
experts, representatives of profes-
sional societies, and experts from fed-
eral agencies. A patient recovering
from inhalational anthrax also
described her illness. The following is
a summary of the presentations and
discussion. 
Prophylaxis1
Ciprofloxacin, doxycycline, and
penicillin G procaine have been
approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) for prophy-
laxis of inhalational Bacillus anthracis
infection, on the basis of efficacy data
in monkeys and pharmacokinetic,
pharmacodynamic, and safety consid-
erations (1-3). During the recent biot-
errorist attacks, interim CDC
recommendations for anthrax prophy-
laxis include ciprofloxacin or doxycy-
cline; amoxicillin (in three daily
doses) is an option for children and
pregnant or lactating women exposed
to strains susceptible to penicillin (4-
6), to avoid potential toxicity of quino-
lones and tetracyclines. Amoxicillin is
not widely recommended as a first-
line prophylactic agent, however,
because of lack of FDA approval, lack
of data regarding efficacy, and uncer-
tainty about the drug’s ability to
achieve adequate therapeutic levels at
standard doses. 
The optimal duration of prophy-
laxis is uncertain; however, 60 days
was recommended, primarily on the
basis of animal studies of anthrax
deaths and spore clearance after expo-
sure. The possible need for longer pro-
phylaxis and vaccine use was
discussed. In monkeys after aerosol
challenge, an estimated 0.5%-1% of
spores remained at 75 days and traces
were present at 100 days; delaying
prophylaxis up to 20 days after expo-
sure prolonged the incubation period
without reducing disease risk (7). In
one human case during the Sverdlovsk
outbreak (former Soviet Union, 1979),
anthrax developed 43 days after
spores were released into the atmo-
sphere (time of exposure unknown)
(2,8). When prophylaxis is delayed or
intermittent, several experts recom-
mended a total of 60 days of therapy.
(On December 18, the Department of
Health and Human Services
announced additional options for pro-
phylaxis of inhalational anthrax for
persons who wish to take extra pre-
cautions, especially those whose expo-
sure may have been high.  Three
options are now offered: 1) 60 days of
antibiotic prophylaxis; 2) 100 days of
antibiotic prophylaxis, and 3) 100
days of antibiotic prophylaxis, plus
anthrax vaccine as investigational
postexposure treatment [3 doses over
a 4-week period] [9].)
The need for prophylaxis is deter-
mined by public health officials on the
basis of an epidemiologic investiga-
tion. Prophylaxis is indicated for per-
sons exposed to an airspace
contaminated with aerosolized B.
anthracis. Prophylaxis is not indicated
for health-care and mortuary workers
who care for patients or attend to
corpses using standard precautions,
for persons who handle or open mail
in the absence of a credible threat, or for
prevention of cutaneous anthrax (10).
Successful implementation of
mass prophylaxis requires clarity of
public health intent and communica-
tion, as well as coordination and col-
laboration. A well-communicated
policy on who receives prophylaxis
and with which drugs is essential.
Agency spokespersons, local health-
care providers, employers, and
employee organizations (e.g., labor
unions) should be familiar with the
policy. Local or regional task forces
may be helpful in planning and com-
municating public health policy, and
resolving jurisdictional issues. Pro-
phylaxis teams should be predesig-
nated to function around the clock.
Team members should have contin-
gency plans for personal needs (e.g.,
child care). Issues for the point of pro-
phylaxis distribution include layout
and managing of traffic flow; security;
availability of medical and office sup-
plies, antibiotic and disease fact
sheets, multilingual staff, and mental
health counselors; legal needs (e.g.,
for a physician to write orders); and
plans for follow-up, including assess-
ment of adherence, illness, and possi-
ble drug adverse effects. Collaboration
among health departments, health-care
delivery organizations, and clinicians
is important. In the 2001 outbreak,
some patients with possible drug side
effects were refused appointments by
their private physicians and were
referred back to the health department.
Anthrax prophylaxis issues need-
ing further consideration or research
include efficacy of additional drugs,
optimal duration of prophylaxis, use-
fulness of a loading dose, safety of
prolonged drug use (especially in chil-
dren and pregnant women), concomi-
tant use of vaccine or antitoxin, level
of infectious dose, and definition of
high-risk exposure (e.g., according to
particle size or degree of environmen-
tal contamination).
Clinical Recognition 
and Diagnosis2
Twenty-two confirmed or sus-
pected cases (11 confirmed inhala-
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tional; 7 confirmed and 4 suspected
cutaneous) were identified in the 2001
outbreak of bioterrorism-related
anthrax. Cases were reported from
Florida, New York, New Jersey, the
District of Columbia, and Connecticut. 
Inhalational Anthrax
Of the 11 patients with inhala-
tional anthrax, 9 (and possibly all 11)
are believed to have been exposed to
mail containing or contaminated with
B. anthracis spores. Median age was
56 years (range 43-94 years). Average
incubation from known exposure to
symptoms was 4 days (range 4-6
days). Fever, chills, drenching sweats,
profound fatigue, minimally produc-
tive cough, nausea or vomiting, and
chest discomfort were symptoms
reported by most patients. Rhinorrhea
and productive cough were uncom-
mon. Chest X-ray at initial examina-
tion showed mediastinal widening,
paratracheal fullness, hilar fullness,
and pleural effusions or infiltrates or
both, but in some patients these initial
findings were subtle. Pleural effusions
were a complication in all 11 patients;
among all 8 patients who had not
received antibiotics, B. anthracis grew
in blood cultures drawn at initial
examination. Six (55%) of 11 patients
have survived with aggressive support-
ive care and multidrug antibiotic regi-
mens including a fluoroquinolone (11).
The differential diagnosis of inha-
lational anthrax versus influenzalike
illness is challenging. Respiratory
viruses, including influenza, are com-
mon causes of influenzalike illness
and tend to circulate in winter. These
viruses are readily communicable, in
contrast to anthrax, which is not
spread from person to person. A his-
tory of influenza vaccination is not
helpful in evaluating the likelihood of
anthrax. Influenzalike illnesses have
many causes besides influenza
viruses, and influenza vaccine is not
100% effective. Unlike patients with
inhalational anthrax, adults with influ-
enza or other viral respiratory illnesses
do not usually have shortness of
breath and vomiting but often have
sore throat or rhinorrhea. Rapid identi-
fication tests for influenza are avail-
able but vary widely in sensitivity.
In the current climate, emergency
department and primary-care physi-
cians should maintain a high index of
suspicion for inhalational anthrax.
Complicating diagnosis is the fact that
patients initially may not appear very
ill (11). A careful history with assess-
ment of epidemiologic risk factors for
anthrax (e.g., working for the postal
service) should be obtained. Commu-
nication between clinicians and health
authorities is critical for obtaining up-
to-date assistance with diagnosis and
management. 
The classic chest X-ray findings—
widened mediastinum or pleural effu-
sions—may be subtle or absent on ini-
tial medical evaluation. In addition,
these radiographic findings are not
unique to anthrax: histoplasmosis, sar-
coidosis, tuberculosis, and lym-
phoma, for example, are included in
the differential diagnosis. A chest
computed tomography scan is helpful
in detecting hemorrhagic mediastinal
lymph nodes and edema, peribronchial
thickening, and pleural effusions, find-
ings seen in patients with inhalational
anthrax. Hyperdense mediastinal and
hilar adenopathy plus mediastinal
edema suggest anthrax. The hemor-
rhagic pleural effusions of inhalational
anthrax typically increase during hos-
pitalization. 
Blood cultures and B. anthracis-
specific polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) of sterile fluids (e.g., blood and
pleural fluid) are important in the
diagnosis of inhalational anthrax.
Serologic testing has also been valu-
able.  An enzyme-linked immunosor-
bent assay (ELISA) to detect
immunoglobulin (Ig) G response to B.
anthracis protective antigen (PA) is
highly sensitive (detects 98.6% of true
positives) but is only approximately
80% specific. To improve specificity,
a PA-competitive inhibition ELISA is
used as a second, confirmatory step.
Preliminary studies indicate that spe-
cific IgG anti-PA antibody can be
detected as early as 10 days, but peak
IgG may not be seen until 40 days
after onset of symptoms.
Immunohistochemical examina-
tion of pleural fluid or transbronchial
biopsy specimens, using antibodies to
B. anthracis cell wall and capsule,
also has an important role in the diag-
nosis of inhalational anthrax, espe-
cially in patients who have received
prior antibiotics. Immunohistochemi-
cal examination can detect intact
bacilli or B. anthracis antigens. PCR,
serologic tests, and immunohis-
tochemical tests are currently avail-
able at CDC or at certain laboratories
in the Laboratory Response Network
(LRN). 
Cutaneous Anthrax
Seven confirmed and four sus-
pected cases of cutaneous anthrax
were identified during the 2001 out-
break. Skin trauma was not associated
with these cases of cutaneous anthrax.
Exposure to contaminated mail was
the apparent source of infection in all
patients. The incubation period after
exposure ranged from 1 to 10 days.
The initial symptom was often a pru-
ritic papule resembling an insect bite.
The papules vesiculated, with some
becoming hemorrhagic. The vesicles
ruptured to form depressed ulcers,
often with local edema, ultimately
forming dry eschars. These stages
occur regardless of antibiotic therapy.
The differential diagnosis of cutane-
ous anthrax includes brown recluse
spider bite, ecthyma, ulceroglandular
tularemia, accidental vaccinia, and
necrotic herpes simplex. Cutaneous
anthrax is painless, does not include
rash, and results in a black eschar.
Patients with cutaneous anthrax may
have fever, extensive edema, and other
systemic signs.
Gram stain and culture of the
lesion are recommended; however,
prior antibiotic treatment rapidly ren-
ders the infected site culture-negative
for B. anthracis. Serologic testing and
punch biopsy at the edge of the lesion,NEWS & NOTES
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examined by silver staining and
immunohistochemical testing, are use-
ful in diagnosing cutaneous anthrax in
patients who have received antibiotic
therapy. 
Clinical recognition and diagnosis
issues needing further consideration
and research include rapid, reliable,
and readily available detection meth-
ods (e.g., PCR and antigen detection);
education and ready access to infor-
mation for clinicians regarding
anthrax clinical features and risk strat-
ification; recognition of anthrax in
children; and the role of serologic test-
ing in the diagnosis and management
of both inhalational and cutaneous
anthrax. 
Treatment3
Treatment recommendations for
anthrax infections have been based on
historical information and limited data
from animals (nonhuman primates), as
well as in vitro findings. Susceptibility
testing of 65 historical isolates was
performed at CDC. In the absence of
published guidelines for testing for B.
anthracis, the standard National Com-
mittee for Clinical Laboratory Stan-
dards broth microdilution method was
used with staphylococcal breakpoints.
These 65 isolates and all those associ-
ated with the 2001 outbreak were sen-
sitive to the quinolones, rifampin,
tetracycline, vancomycin, imipenem,
meropenem, chloramphenicol, clinda-
mycin, and the aminoglycosides. The
isolates have intermediate-range sus-
ceptibility to the macrolides but are
resistant to extended-spectrum cepha-
losporins, including third-generation
agents (e.g., ceftriaxone), and to tri-
methoprim-sulfamethoxazole (12).
The decision regarding the use of
penicillins, the drugs historically used
for treatment and prophylaxis of
anthrax, is complicated. An inhibition
assay shows beta-lactamase activity at
low levels in the isolates. Genomic
sequence data show two beta-lacta-
mases: a potential penicillinase (class
A) and a cephalosporinase (class B),
which is expressed. Concern about the
use of penicillin arises because an
inducible penicillinase could be acti-
vated in the face of treatment with
beta-lactams, particularly if the num-
ber of organisms present is high, as
appears typical with inhalational dis-
ease. Concerns have also been raised
about the poor penetration of beta-lac-
tams into macrophages, the site where
B. anthracis spores germinate.
Ciprofloxacin has been recom-
mended on the basis of in vivo (ani-
mal) findings; other quinolones have
not been studied in the primate model.
Doxycycline, another first-line agent,
should not be used if meningitis is sus-
pected because of its lack of adequate
central nervous system penetration.
Bacteremic patients are often initially
treated with a multidrug regimen to
which an offending organism is pre-
sumed sensitive; this treatment allows
empiric coverage for other pathogens.
Thus, the recommendation for initial
treatment of inhalational anthrax is a
multidrug regimen of either ciproflox-
acin or doxycycline along with one or
more agents to which the organism is
typically sensitive. After susceptibility
testing and clinical improvement, the
regimen may be altered. The drugs of
choice for treatment of cutaneous dis-
ease are also ciprofloxacin or doxycy-
cline. A penicillin such as amoxicillin
or amoxacillin/clavulanic acid may be
used to complete the course if suscep-
tibility testing is supportive.
On the basis of risk for the inhala-
tional form of the disease, cases of
both inhalational and cutaneous
anthrax associated with the 2001 out-
break are being treated with 60 days of
antibiotics. Although zoonotic cutane-
ous anthrax is treated with a 7- to 10-
day regimen, inhaled spores can
remain latent for extended periods.
Two months after the 2001 out-
break, 6 of 11 patients with inhala-
tional anthrax had survived. Keys to
successful management appear to be
early institution of antibiotics and
aggressive supportive care. Chest tube
drainage of the recurrent pleural effu-
sions, which are typically hemor-
rhagic, often leads to dramatic clinical
improvement. Because these effusions
tend to reaccumulate rapidly, insertion
of a chest tube or tubes has been bene-
ficial.
Anthrax treatment issues meriting
further consideration relate to adjunc-
tive therapies. Clindamycin has been
suggested to have antitoxin properties
(as in the treatment of toxic shock
associated with group A streptococci,
Staphylococcus aureus, and Clostrid-
ium infections). Steroids have been
used to control the edema of cutane-
ous disease and have been suggested
for the treatment of meningitis or sub-
stantial mediastinal edema (13). Other
antitoxin agents investigated in vitro
include angiotensin-converting
enzyme inhibitors, calcium channel
blockers, and tumor necrosis factor
inhibitors. Specific anthrax IgG antis-
era, collected from military or other
vaccinees, may be an adjunct, as well
as administration of the vaccine itself.
David M. Bell, Phyllis E. Kozarsky, 
and David S. Stephens
Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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Report Summary
Public Health
Assessment of
Potential Biological
Terrorism Agents
As part of a Congressional initia-
tive begun in 1999 to upgrade national
public health capabilities for response
to acts of biological terrorism, the
Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) was designated the
lead agency for overall public health
planning. A Bioterrorism Prepared-
ness and Response Office has been
formed to help target several areas for
initial preparedness activities, includ-
ing planning, improved surveillance
and epidemiologic capabilities, rapid
laboratory diagnostics, enhanced com-
munications, and medical therapeu-
tics stockpiling (1). To focus these
preparedness efforts, however, the
biological agents towards which the
efforts should be targeted had to first
be formally identified and placed in
priority order. Many biological agents
can cause illness in humans, but not all
are capable of affecting public health
and medical infrastructures on a large
scale. 
The military has formally assessed
multiple agents for their strategic use-
fulness on the battlefield (2). In addi-
tion, the Working Group on Civilian
Biodefense, using an expert panel con-
sensus-based process, has identified
several biological agents as potential
high-impact agents against civilian
populations (3-7). To guide national
public health bioterrorism prepared-
ness and response efforts, a method
was sought for assessing potential bio-
logical threat agents that would pro-
vide a reviewable, reproducible means
for standardized evaluations of these
threats. 
In June 1999, a meeting of
national experts was convened to 1)
review potential general criteria for
selecting the biological agents that
pose the greatest threats to civilians
and 2) review lists of previously iden-
tified biological threat agents and
apply these criteria to identify which
should be evaluated further and priori-
tized for public health preparedness
efforts. This report outlines the overall
selection and prioritization process
used to determine the biological
agents for public health preparedness
activities. Identifying these priority
agents will help facilitate coordinated
planning efforts among federal agen-
cies, state and local emergency
response and public health agencies,
and the medical community.
Overview of Agent Selection 
and Prioritization Process
On June 3-4, 1999, academic
infectious disease experts, national
public health experts, Department of
Health and Human Services agency
representatives, civilian and military
intelligence experts, and law enforce-
ment officials1 met to review and
comment on the threat potential of
various agents to civilian populations.
The following general areas were used
as criteria: 1) public health impact
based on illness and death; 2) delivery
potential to large populations based on
stability of the agent, ability to mass
produce and distribute a virulent
agent, and potential for person-to-per-
son transmission of the agent; 3) pub-
lic perception as related to public fear
and potential civil disruption; and 4)
special public health preparedness
needs based on stockpile require-
ments, enhanced surveillance, or diag-
nostic needs. Participants reviewed
lists of biological warfare or potential
biological threat agents and selected
those they felt posed the greatest
threat to civilian populations.
The following unclassified docu-
ments containing potential biological
threat agents were reviewed: 1) the
Select Agent Rule list, 2) the Austra-
lian Group List for Biological Agents
for Export Control, 3) the unclassified
military list of biological warfare
agents, 4) the Biological Weapons
Convention list, and 5) the World
Health Organization Biological Weap-
ons list (8-12). Participants with
appropriate clearance levels reviewed
intelligence information regarding
classified suspected biological agent
threats to civilian populations. Geneti-
cally engineered or recombinant bio-
logical agents were considered but not
included for final prioritization
because of the inability to predict the
nature of these agents and thus iden-
tify specific preparedness activities for
public health and medical response to
them. In addition, no information was
available about the likelihood for use
of one biological agent over another.
This aspect, therefore, could not be
considered in the final evaluation of
the potential biological threat agents.
Participants discussed and identi-
fied agents they felt had the potential
1Participants are listed in Acknowledg-
ments.